

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC# 01975-85
12 April 1985

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: MG Stephen E. Nichols, USA
National Intelligence Officer for
General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT: Active Army -- Reserve Component Ratio

1. In the Washington Post, Friday, 12 April 1985, there is a front page article that implies added risks as the strength of the Army Reserve and the National Guard grow to exceed that of the Active Army. I believe that the reporter is looking at this change through the wrong end of the telescope.

2. The Active Army authorization is about 780,000 and it is projected to remain at that level. Even though the Reserve Components increase in strength, the Active Army remains at the same level. We are not trading Active Army strength for reserve strength. I see the increase in Reserve Component strength as all positive. Manning and equipping the additional Reserve Component force will require additional funds, of course; but, if those funds are not obtained to the detriment of the Active Army, then I see no decrease in effectiveness nor increase in risk. In this case, more is better.

3. Forming two additional Active Army divisions without any increase in manpower authorization means that the Army will have to cut back to some extent on service and support unit strength. We have already done a lot of that. The reductions in these Active Army units are usually compensated for by the activation of similar units in the National Guard or Army Reserve. These changes are not so great as to imply a greatly increased risk.

4. Some of the most effective Reserve Component units are the combat support and combat service support units. They have some shortcomings in the tactical skills, but they are reasonably competent in carrying out their support missions. Dr. Korb is absolutely right in stating that Reserve Component units cannot do everything as well as Active Army units; but having more of them simply means increased capability.

5. George Wilson seems to have taken a downside view of our increased Reserve Component strength. I would argue that it is an upside change.

Stephen E. Nichols
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cc: C/NIC
VC/NIC

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MEMO FOR: DCI
DDCI

FROM: NIO/GPF

SUBJECT: Active Army -- Reserve Component Ratio

NIO/GPF:SNichols:lht

(12 Apr 85)



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WASHINGTON POST, Friday, 12 April 1985

Reserves Soon to Outnumber U.S. Soldiers on Active Duty

Change Termed Risky but Thrifty

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. Army soon will have, for the first time, more people in its drilling reserve units than on active duty, according to Pentagon manpower chief Lawrence J. Korb.

The reversal in the active-to-reserve force ratio, scheduled to take place in fiscal 1988, has far-reaching policy implications.

The change stems in large part from the Army's decision to freeze its active-duty strength at 781,000 for the rest of this decade to concentrate its resources on the weapons it has ordered under President Reagan's rearmament program.

"This increases your risk but it is

cheaper to do," Korb said in endorsing what he called the "historic change" in the Army's force structure. At the same time, he rang some warning bells.

"We cannot go much farther without changing our military strategy," the assistant defense secretary for manpower, installations and logistics said. He cited as an example today's forward-deployment strategy, which calls for keeping troops on front lines in places as far apart as West Germany and Korea.

Korb said that if the need for troops overseas increases while active-duty strength remains frozen, the United States would be faced with several difficult choices.

See RESERVES, A14, Col. 1

A14 FRIDAY, APRIL 12, 1985

THE WASH

Reservists Will Outnumber Soldiers As Pentagon Stresses Weapons Outlays

RESERVES, From A1

One would be to station most of the active Army abroad and depend on reserves to fill home-front needs, such as responding to unforeseen emergencies. One problem with this option, he said, would be that soldiers would have no ready-made places in the United States to go after serving their tours because of the shrunken "rotational base."

A second choice would be to retrench and stop deploying so many troops in forward areas of the world, a decision that almost cer-

tainly would distress several of the allied governments in the North

"This increases your risk but it is cheaper to do."

—Lawrence J. Korb

Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A third option, Korb continued, would be to hire more civilians, both Americans and host-country citizens, to take over more jobs of

the active-duty Army overseas. But the manpower chief said there is a limit to how far the United States can go in this direction.

Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, NATO commander, already has called for sending more Army and Air Force troops to Europe to help man the new weaponry being delivered there, including Air Force cruise missiles. Rogers has asked Congress to lift its ceiling of 325,600 U.S. troops in Europe.

By the end of fiscal 1986, the Pentagon has projected 781,000 troops on active duty and 751,000 in the reserves, who drill one week

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end a month and two weeks every summer. Of the 751,000, the Army National Guard accounts for 450,000 people and Army reserve units, 301,000.

The crossover is scheduled to occur in fiscal 1988, when the Pentagon expects to have 805,800 people in the reserves and 781,000 in the active duty force. Of the 805,800, the Guard's slice is projected at 477,600 and the Army reserve units, 328,200.

"I have two concerns," Korb said. "One is if the reserve and Guard units can meet their recruiting quotas and the second is the difficulties that may come in trying to deploy the Army's two new light divisions."

The light divisions are comprised of three brigades, one of which is made up of reservists. Korb said the light divisions are designed to be fast-response outfits. However, assembling the reserve brigade's

members might slow its deployment or compel the light division to rush to the trouble spot with only two of its three brigades.

When Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger took office in 1981, his blueprint called for expanding the Army by 200,000. Instead, the savings to be gained by freezing the size of the Army and letting the reserves grow proved irresistible to both military and congressional leaders. Korb said it costs about \$6,000 a year to support a reservist compared to about \$30,000 for an active-duty soldier.

"We shouldn't kid ourselves that for every mission the reservists can do as well as active duty forces," Korb said. It will take reserve units longer to get ready for deployment, the manpower chief warned.

"Will we have given them enough training and can we mobilize them fast enough?" Korb wondered.